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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jason Scott Downing appeals from the district court’s partial denial of his 
motion to suppress. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 On the evening of October 6th, 2015, Idaho Department of Correction 
Probation and Parole officers were performing a home verification on one of their 
probationers.  (Tr., p. 42, Ls. 8-15; p. 42, L. 25 – p. 43, L. 21.)  Downing, a friend 
of a friend, answered the door and let the officers in.  (Tr., p. 5, L. 25 – p. 8, L. 
1.) 
 The officers, who had a Fourth Amendment waiver to search the 
probationer’s home, saw the probationer behind a couch in the front room.  (Tr., 
p. 44, Ls. 11-15; p. 46, 12-14.)  The probationer was behaving bizarrely—he was 
“acting very psychotic and got on the floor underneath the table and was 
hysterical” and making nonsensical statements.  (Tr., p. 10, Ls. 10-22.)  A third 
individual was also inside the house, and had to be located and brought into the  
living room.  (Tr., p. 11, Ls. 14-22; p. 45, Ls. 17-21.)  The officers eventually 
restrained the probationer, who was sobbing, rocking back and forth, and who 
ultimately “curled up in a ball on the floor.”  (Tr., p. 27, L. 9; p. 49, Ls. 16-20.) 
 At one point, in an attempt to leave, Downing stood up from the couch.  
(Tr., p. 11, Ls. 1-11.)  The officer by the door asked Downing to sit, which he did.  
(Tr., p. 11, Ls. 5-11; p. 50, Ls. 17-18.) 
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 While one probation officer stayed in the living room a second officer 
searched the home.  (Tr., p. 46, Ls. 3-8.)  After three to four minutes the officer 
found drug paraphernalia in the garage.  (Tr., p. 46, L. 9 – p. 47, L. 3.)  The 
probation officers then made an assist call to the Boise Police Department.  (Tr., 
p. 47, Ls. 11-17.)  Without reading Downing his Miranda rights, the officers 
asked Downing if he had been smoking in the garage, which Downing admitted. 
(Tr., p. 12, L. 5 – p. 13, L. 1.)   
Boise Police officer Holtry arrived some 17 minutes later.  (Tr., p. 33, Ls. 
5-22; p. 61, Ls. 6-7.)  Officer Holtry went outside with Downing and read him his 
Miranda rights.  (Tr., p. 14, Ls. 7-22; p. 30, L. 11 – L. 31, L. 2.)   Downing agreed 
to talk to the officer and admitted he had been using drugs in the house that day.  
(Tr., p. 31, Ls. 3-18.)  Officer Holtry, citing safety concerns, frisked Downing for 
weapons.  (Tr., p. 14, Ls. 23-25; p. 27, Ls. 11-25; p. 29, Ls. 2-14.)  The officer 
testified that the frisk led to the following exchange: 
Q. When you were searching Mr. Downing, did you find 
anything that warranted further attention? 
 
A. Just briefly, on his front pocket. I felt something in [his] right 
pants pocket. 
 
Q. What did you believe it to be when you felt it? 
 
A. I’m relatively familiar with. I had an idea. I don’t know what it 
was, but I just asked him, “What is this? What’s in your pocket?” 
He said, “You can take it out.” I asked him again, I said, “What is 
it?” And he said, “It’s Meth.” So I removed it and put it in my pocket. 
It was a little nylon bag with a silver key chain screw top. 
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(Tr., p. 29, L. 18 – p. 30, L. 4.)  Downing was arrested for frequenting a place 
where drugs are used or sold, and possession of methamphetamine.  (Tr., p. 31, 
Ls. 19-23; p. 32, Ls. 11-19.) 
Downing moved to suppress evidence of the statements he made and the 
evidence that was found.  (R., pp. 46-47, 49-59.)  His motion was partially 
granted, as the district court suppressed the pre-Miranda statements that he 
made to the probation officers.  (Tr., p. 72, Ls. 3-4.) 
But the district court denied the rest of Downing’s motion to suppress.  
(Tr., p. 72, Ls. 5-9.)  The court found that his initial detention was proper per 
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), even though, unlike Summers, the 
detention here was pursuant to a probation search and not a search warrant.  
(Tr., p. 64, L. 14 – p. 65, L. 13.)  The district court also found that the frisk of 
Downing was justified on officer safety grounds, and that Downing consented to 
the search of his pocket.  (Tr., p. 67, L. 24 – p. 69, L. 15; p. 71, L. 5 – p. 72, L. 
2.)  Lastly, the court found that the post-Miranda admissions Downing made to 
Officer Holtry would not be suppressed.  (Tr., p. 72, Ls. 5-7.)  
Downing entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the 
district court’s ruling on his motion to suppress.  (Tr., p. 75, L. 21- p. 76, L.4; p. 
86, Ls. 6-12; R., pp. 74-81.)  He timely appealed from the district court’s 






Downing states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the District Court err in substantially denying Mr. Downing’s 
suppression motion? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 3) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
Has Downing failed to show the district court erred by partially denying his 









 Downing argues that the district court erred by partially denying his motion 
to suppress.  He contends that his initial detention was illegal, because the 
Summers rule justifying third-party detentions would not apply to warrantless 
probation searches.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-7.)  Downing also argues that the 
court erred in determining the ensuing frisk was proper based on officer safety 
grounds.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-10.)  Finally, Downing claims the court erred in 
determining that he consented to the search of his pocket, because Downing 
“testified that Officer Holtry had already reached in his pocket when he 
consented to the removal of the object….”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 11.) 
 These arguments fail.  This court should apply the Summers rule here, 
because the detention here prevented flight, ensured officer safety, and 
hastened the orderly completion of the stop.  The frisk was also proper, as the 
officer had reasonable safety grounds necessitating a pat search for weapons.  
Moreover, Downing has failed to meaningfully address, let alone show clearly 
erroneous, the court’s factual finding that Downing consented to the search of 
his pocket before the officer reached in his pocket.  Lastly, Downing was 
arrested for frequenting a residence where drugs were present; accordingly, the 
methamphetamine in his pocket would have been inevitably discovered 
regardless of the propriety of the frisk, or his consent to the search.  The district 
court therefore correctly ruled on Downing’s motion. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
 
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers 
to the trial court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, but exercises free 
review of the trial court’s determination as to whether constitutional standards 
have been satisfied in light of the facts.  State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 
485-86, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 84, 90 P.3d 
306, 309 (2004).  If findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record, 
those “[f]indings will not be deemed clearly erroneous.”  State v. Stewart, 145 
Idaho 641, 648, 181 P.3d 1249, 1256 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting State v. Jaborra, 
143 Idaho 94, 98, 137 P.3d 481, 485 (Ct. App. 2006)). 
 
C. The District Court Correctly Applied Michigan v. Summers To Determine 
The Initial Detention Of Downing Was Justified 
 
 The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons … against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause … particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”  
U.S. Const. amend. IV.  Generally, “Fourth Amendment seizures are 
‘reasonable’ only if based on probable cause” to believe that a crime was 
committed.  Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, __, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1037 
(2013) (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979)).  
Nevertheless, there are some exceptions to this general rule, and “some latitude 
for police to detain” when “the intrusion on the citizen’s privacy ‘was so much 
less severe’ than that involved in a traditional arrest that ‘the opposing interests 
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in crime prevention and detection and in the police officer’s safety’ could support 
the seizure as reasonable.”  Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1037 (quoting Summers, 452 
U.S. at 697-98); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); Dunaway, 442 
U.S. at 209.  
 In Michigan v. Summers, the United States Supreme Court considered 
such an exception: whether law enforcement executing a warrant to search a 
home could detain individuals found there.  452 U.S. 692 (1981).  The police 
officers there were “about to execute a warrant to search a house for narcotics” 
when they ran into Summers outside the house, attempting to leave.  Id. at 693.  
Summers was asked to help law enforcement enter the house and was 
“detained … while they searched” it.  Id.  Summers, who owned the house, was 
searched, drugs were found, and he was charged with possession of a controlled 
substance.  Id. at 693-94.  Summers moved to suppress that evidence as the 
product of an illegal detention, raising the issue of “whether the initial detention 
of [Summers] violated his constitutional right to be secure against an 
unreasonable seizure of his person.”  Id. at 694. 
The Summers Court concluded such a detention would be reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment.  Id. 694-706.  The Court’s decision was based on 
several factors: first of all, it considered “the fact that the police had obtained a 
warrant to search respondent’s house for contraband.”  Id. at 701.  The Court 
noted that the detention was “surely less intrusive” than the search that had been 
authorized.  Id. at 701.  Moreover, the Court found that most citizens “would elect 
to remain in order to observe the search of their possessions”; that a detention 
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accommodating a search was unlikely to be “unduly prolonged” because the 
information sought “normally will be obtained through the search and not through 
the detention”; and that a detention inside the home would not embarrass the 
defendant with either “the inconvenience [or] the indignity associated with a 
compelled visit to the police station.”  Id. at 701-02. 
Three key factors also justified the detention in Summers: preventing 
flight, officer safety, and the orderly completion of the search.  See id. at 702-03.  
As the Summers Court explained: 
In assessing the justification for the detention of an occupant of 
premises being searched for contraband pursuant to a valid 
warrant, both the law enforcement interest and the nature of the 
“articulable facts” supporting the detention are relevant. Most 
obvious is the legitimate law enforcement interest in preventing 
flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found. Less 
obvious, but sometimes of greater importance, is the interest in 
minimizing the risk of harm to the officers. Although no special 
danger to the police is suggested by the evidence in this record, the 
execution of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of 
transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts 
to conceal or destroy evidence. The risk of harm to both the police 
and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise 
unquestioned command of the situation. Finally, the orderly 
completion of the search may be facilitated if the occupants of the 
premises are present. Their self-interest may induce them to open 
locked doors or locked containers to avoid the use of force that is 
not only damaging to property but may also delay the completion of 
the task at hand. 
 
Id. (internal citations omitted).  The Summers Court thus held “that a warrant to 
search for contraband found on probable cause implicitly carries with it the 
limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is 
conducted.”  Id. at 705. 
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Since Summers, other courts have asked whether its logic would extend 
to detentions accompanying a lawful but warrantless search—for example, a 
probation or parole search pursuant to a Fourth Amendment waiver.  In People 
v. Matelski, a California Court of Appeals concluded that Summers would apply 
in the case of a probation search.  82 Cal. App. 4th 837 (2000). There, probation 
officers were conducting a warrantless search of a home, pursuant to a Fourth 
Amendment waiver, after their probationer failed a drug test. Id. at 841, 851.  “As 
the officers arrived at the home” they encountered the exiting defendants and 
detained them.  Id. at 841.  The officers learned the defendants had active arrest 
warrants, searched them, and found drugs.  Id. at 841-42.  The Matelski 
defendants moved to suppress the evidence, and the state argued, among 
things, that Summers justified the seizure.  Id. at 842-43. 
The Matelski Court agreed that Summers would apply to probation 
searches, noting first that the presence of a search warrant was just a “significant 
factor” in the analysis, to be considered among other significant factors such as 
“the legitimate law enforcement interest in preventing flight if contraband is 
found, and officer safety considerations.”  Id. at 847.  The court, favorably 
quoting prior precedent, explained why the existence of a search warrant was not 
dispositive: 
With regard to the crucial distinguishing factor, the lack of a search 
warrant, the [People v. Hannah] court said: “Defendant correctly 
points out that Summers, supra, and the other cases discussed, 
involved detention of an individual during the execution of a search 
warrant for contraband. By the same token, none of these cases 
require the existence of a search warrant for contraband as a 
prerequisite to finding the detention of an individual to be 
reasonable. The existence of a warrant is but one factor the 
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courts consider when determining the governmental interest 
involved.” 
 
Id. at 849 (emphasis added) (quoting People v. Hannah, 51 Cal. App. 4th 1335, 
1343 (1996)).  The  Matelski Court also pointed out that the extent of the 
intrusion was “minimal”: the detention lasted 15 minutes, was shielded from 
public view, and was justified by “the need to determine what connection 
defendant, who appeared to be more than a stranger or visitor, had to the 
premises, and by the related need to ensure officer safety and security at the site 
of a search for narcotics.”  82 Cal. App. at 849-50. 
 Additionally, the Matelski Court found that “there were also officer safety 
concerns” justifying the search, and observed that “[s]ecurity demands that the 
persons in the home at the time of the officers’ arrival remain there until the 
officers have completed their investigation.”  Id. at 850.  Finally, the court pointed 
out that: 
Here, the officers had neither an arrest nor a search warrant. 
However, they were not acting randomly. The officers were 
conducting a valid search of the home of a probationer who had 
failed a drug test.  In order to obtain probation on general terms 
and conditions, a criminal defendant must waive his Fourth 
Amendment rights: “A probationer, unlike a parolee, consents to 
the waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights in exchange for the 
opportunity to avoid service of a state prison term. Probation is not 
a right, but a privilege.” Since the probationer waived his Fourth 
Amendment rights, the officers were properly able to enter the 
premises to search it without a warrant. 
 
Id. at 851 (internal citations omitted).  The court therefore concluded that “the 
intrusion on defendants’ privacy was minimal, the governmental interests stated 
above outweighed the brief intrusion on defendants’ privacy, and that the lack of 
a search or arrest warrant was not dispositive.”  Id. 
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Idaho courts have not expressly held whether the Summers rule applies to 
warrantless probation searches, but the district court here correctly concluded 
that it would.  Because, as the court noted, the factors identified by Summers 
and Matelski—preventing flight, officer safety, and the orderly completion of the 
search—all apply here: 
Now Michigan versus Summers differs a little in—and that’s the 
case involving the execution of a search warrant—but I think the 
same interests are certainly displayed here; that there’s three 
important interests, which includes the preventing flight of the 
occupants[,] minimizing the potential for harm for law or peace 
enforcement officers and facilitating the completion of the search, 
and so even though a [probation] search is a warrantless search, 
it’s not an execution of a search warrant, those same overriding 
concerns were certainly present in what the officer saw given that 
Mr. Cook, apparently, was fleeing or trying to hide from the officers. 
Someone else was present in the residence, and the officers had 
concerns for their safety. 
 
So, in this particular case, the probation officers had the ability to 
detain for investigation anyone found on the premises who were 
not readily ascertainable residents or occupants and to determine 
who was in the residence and to assure it was a secure 
residence…. 
 
(Tr., p. 64, L. 16 – p. 65, L. 11.) 
The district court’s conclusion that Summers would apply here was 
correct.  The probation officers’ entered a chaotic home containing unidentified 
individuals, and detaining them on the couch was necessary to prevent flight; 
Downing himself attempted to leave before being asked to sit down.  (Tr., p. 11, 
Ls. 3-11; p. 44, Ls. 6-10.)  Because the officer was armed and standing by the 
door, Downing’s attempt to leave also created a self-evident safety risk—which 
was on top of the additional safety risks posed by the probationer, who was 
sobbing, hiding behind the couch, and in Downing’s own words, who “started 
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acting very psychotic and got on the floor underneath the table and was 
hysterical.”  (Tr., p. 10, Ls. 18-19.)  Moreover the officers could not initially locate 
everyone inside the house—a third individual had to be found inside the house 
and brought in to the living room.  (Tr., p. 11, Ls. 14-18; p. 45, Ls. 17-21.)  
Downing’s detention took place inside the home, shielded from public scrutiny 
and potential embarrassment, and was brief, with Officer Holtry arriving within 17 
minutes of being called.  (Tr., p. 33, Ls. 5-22; Tr., p. 61, Ls. 2-7.)  All these 
factors justified detaining Downing by asking him to sit on the couch while the 
probation officers secured the disordered, potentially dangerous scene and 
effected the lawful search.  Regardless of the existence of a warrant to search 
the home, the important interests identified by the Summers all existed here; this 
court, like the Matelski Court, should find that the Summers rule applies here, 
which would justify Downing’s brief detention as the officers secured the scene. 
Downing argues that Summers would not apply here, because Summers 
“involved a search warrant and the owner of the house subject to such warrant; it 
did not involve a third party at the residence of a probationer.”  (Appellant’s brief, 
p. 5.)  Downing cites to extra-jurisdictional authority in support of this proposition, 
and contends that the Idaho Court of Appeals has “expressly declined to apply 
Summers in the manner in which the District Court did in this case.”  (Appellant’s 
brief, p. 5.)   
These arguments fail.  All other factors being equal, if a third-party 
detention would be allowed in light of a valid search warrant, then it would also 
be allowed pursuant to a lawful probation search, where the home owner has 
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waived his Fourth Amendment rights.  Moreover, while the Summers Court 
admittedly considered the existence a warrant of “prime importance,” it did not 
specifically address the question of a probation search, nor did it hold that the 
existence of a warrant was a dispositive question.  See 452 U.S. at 701-06.  
Indeed, if the existence of a warrant was dispositive, then there would be no 
need for the Summers Court to engage in a balancing test as it did: ruminating 
over factors such as suspect flight, defendant embarrassment, officer safety, and 
the orderly completion of the search, among other things.  Id. at 701-04; but cf. 
State v. Williams, 2016 WL 4492579 (Ct. App. 2016) (appearing to require a 
search or arrest warrant, but proceeding to apply the Summers multi-factor test).  
In any event, the Summers Court’s application of a multi-factor test shows that 
the existence of a warrant is just another factor, and further implies that in other 
cases where the rest of the factors are plainly evident—such as here—detention 
would be proper. 
The remaining authority Downing relies on is inapplicable to the issues at 
hand.  The Tchirkova Court did not interpret Summers, or even cite to Summers 
in its opinion, much less find the application of its rationale to “valid probation 
searches to be an overreach.” (See Appellant’s brief, p. 5); Tchirokva v. Kelly, 
1998 WL 125542 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).  Rather, the court there expressly analyzed 
the authority of Eastern District of New York probation officers to detain third 
parties under the “EDNY Search and Seizure Policy Statement” the United 
States Code, and a “United States Parole Commission Memo to U.S. District 
Judges and Magistrates, and Chief Probation Officers,” which per the court 
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provided that “officers are not authorized to restrain third parties during a 
search.”  Id. at *8.  Given the inapplicability of  federal statutes, New York policy 
statements, and federal parole commission memoranda to Idaho state probation 
officers, Tchirkova, placed in context, is unilluminating. 
 Likewise, State v. Reynolds, 143 Idaho 911, 155 P.3d 712 (Ct. App. 
2007), does not support Downing’s position.  Downing interprets the Reynolds 
holding as the Court of Appeals  “expressly declin[ing] to apply Summers” to a 
probation search.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)  But the Reynolds Court only 
“expressly declined” to apply Summers insofar it never reached the issue: it 
stated that “[w]e therefore need not decide whether the police can 
constitutionally detain individuals found on the premises of a lawful probation 
search.”  Reynolds, 143 Idaho at 916, 155 P.3d at 717 (italic emphasis in 
original, boldface emphasis added).  Because Reynolds was resolved on a 
different issue, the Reynolds Court never decided whether Summers would 
apply—let alone expressly ruled that it would not.  See id.  In sum, Downing has 
failed to show that the Summers rule should not apply here. 
This Court, however, should find that Summers would control here. Per 
Summers, the district court correctly concluded that Downing’s brief detention 
was permissible given the facts. 
 
D. The District Court Correctly Found That The Ensuing Frisk Of Downing 
Was Reasonable Because It Was Justified By Officer-Safety Concerns 
 
Under the Fourth Amendment an officer may “conduct a limited self-
protective pat down search of a detainee in order to remove any weapons.”  
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State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 660, 152 P.3d 16, 21 (2007) (citing State v. 
Wright, 134 Idaho 79, 82, 996 P.2d 298, 301 (2000)).  Such searches are 
“evaluated in light of the facts known to the officers on the scene and the 
inference of the risk of danger reasonably drawn from the totality of the 
circumstances.”  Henage, 143 Idaho at 660, 152 P.3d at 21 (quotations and 
citations omitted).  The ultimate inquiry is an objective one, requiring the court 
consider whether the facts available to the officer would “warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.”  Id. 
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 22).   
 The Idaho Supreme Court has further held that “[a] person can be armed 
without posing a risk of danger,” such that the mere knowledge that an individual 
has a weapon is insufficient to justify a frisk; there must also be a basis for 
concluding the armed individual is dangerous.  Henage, 143 Idaho at 660, 152 
P.3d at 21.  “Several factors influence whether a reasonable person in the 
officer’s position would conclude that a particular person was armed and 
dangerous.”  State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 819, 203 P.3d 1203, 1218 (2009).  
The factors include whether:  (1) “there were any bulges in the suspect’s clothing 
that resembled a weapon”; (2) “the encounter took place at night or in a high 
crime area”; (3) “the individual made threatening or furtive movements”; (4) “the 
individual indicated that he or she possessed a weapon”; (5) “the individual 
appeared to be under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs”; (6) the individual 
“was unwilling to cooperate”; and (7) the individual “had a reputation for 
dangerousness.”  Id. (citations omitted).  “Whether any of these circumstances, 
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taken together or by themselves, are enough to justify a [pat] frisk depends on 
an analysis of the totality of the circumstances.”  Id. 
 Here, the district court correctly found the frisk of Downing was justified by 
officer safety concerns based on the totality of the circumstances.  The scene 
here was chaotic: Downing himself testified that the probationer was “acting very 
psychotic” and “hysterical” (Tr., p. 10, Ls. 17-19), and when Officer Holtry arrived 
the probationer was “curled up into a little fetal position,” sobbing, trying to 
conceal himself “under a lamp.”  (Tr., p. 27, Ls. 6-10.)  The encounter took place 
at night, and Officer Holtry noted Downing’s height, and given the scene, the 
officer was “looking for weapons”—he didn’t “want anybody with a gun or a 
knife,” and “[i]f they’re going to maintain a position of being unsecured,” as 
Downing was, “I just want to make sure they don’t have anything that can harm 
me or anybody else.”  (Tr., p. 25, Ls. 6-7; p. 29, Ls. 4-14.)  On direct 
examination, Officer Holtry gave the following inventory of concerns: 
Well, my main concern is being by myself. I didn’t know who was 
who, who was there, who was doing what. The fact that I was 
advised that when they initially knocked on the door, the one 
offender had tried to conceal himself behind a couch. He was trying 
to hide. I didn’t know who anybody was on the scene or what their 
involvement was, so just initially is to sort of secure things and 
assign safety assessment, and make sure everybody’s contained in 
one area and nobody has any weapons or anything like that on 
them. 
 
(Tr., p. 27, Ls. 13-22.)  And the cross-examination of Officer Holtry only 
reaffirmed the objective propriety of the frisk:  
Q. Now you testified that your primary concern upon arriving in 
















Q. So as a result, one of the first things you do with Mr. 
Downing after reading him his rights, is to make sure that he 




(Tr., p. 36, Ls. 11-25.)   
The safety concerns and other facts before Officer Holtry would plainly 
“warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief” that frisking Downing for 
weapons “was appropriate.”  Downing’s own trial counsel apparently agreed, 
seemingly abandoning his specific challenge to the propriety of the frisk (R., pp. 
55-56) in light of what he called the “fairly detrimental” testimony of Holtry and 
Downing.  (See Tr., p. 53, L. 25 – p. 54, L. 2.)  Following a challenge only to the 
detention of Downing (Tr., p. 54, L. 6 – p. 57, L. 18), and the consent to the 
search (Tr., p. 57, L. 19 – p. 59, L. 10), Downing’s counsel made the following 
concession in his closing argument: 
But that little tangent[1] aside, everything that police Officer 
Holtry did on his version, on the police officer’s version of 
events, seems to be according to the constitution. Our 
argument was that the damage was already done. 
 
                                            
1 The “little tangent” was Downing’s testimony that the officer began his search of 
the pocket before asking permission.  (Tr., p. 58, Ls. 13-19.) 
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(Tr., p. 58, Ls. 20-24 (emphasis added).)  The State agrees with defense 
counsel’s candid assessment of Officer Holtry’s frisk.  Based on the facts known 
to the officer the frisk was reasonable, and the district court correctly concluded 
the same. 
 
E. Downing Has Failed To Show That The District Court Clearly Erred When 
It Found That Downing Consented To The Search Of His Pocket 
 
A consented-to warrantless search does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citations 
omitted); State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 1052, 1057 (2003); 
State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 852, 26 P.3d 31, 35 (2001).  Consent is valid if it 
is free and voluntary.  Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 225-26.  The voluntariness of an 
individual’s consent is a question of fact to be determined based upon the totality 
of the circumstances.  Varie, 135 Idaho at 852, 26 P.3d at 35 (citing Bustamonte, 
412 U.S. at 248-49). 
 The court correctly concluded that Downing consented to the search of his 
pocket, from which the methamphetamine was retrieved.  This factual finding 
was based on the officer’s unmistakable testimony: 
Q. When you were searching Mr. Downing, did you find 
anything that warranted further attention? 
 
A. Just briefly, on his front pocket. I felt something in [his] right 
pants pocket. 
 
Q. What did you believe it to be when you felt it? 
 
A. I’m relatively familiar with. I had an idea. I don’t know what it 
was, but I just asked him, “What is this? What’s in your 
pocket?” He said, “You can take it out.” I asked him again, I 
said, “What is it?” And he said, “It’s Meth.” So I removed it and 
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put it in my pocket. It was a little nylon bag with a silver key 
chain screw top. 
 
(Tr., p. 29, L. 18 – p. 30, L. 4 (emphasis added.)  Later in his testimony the 
officer reiterated that the request for permission occurred before he reached into 
Downing’s pocket: 





Q. Your testimony is you asked for permission first? 
 
A. It was – what it says, he said, you can take it out, and I 
asked him again what it was. 
 








(Tr., p. 38, L. 24 – p. 39, L. 9 (emphasis added).) 
Based on this testimony the district court made a factual finding that 
Downing consented to the search: “Officer Holtry asked if he could remove the 
item from Mr. Downing’s pocket.  Mr. Downing agreed by saying you can take it 
out.”  (Tr., p. 62, Ls. 16-18.)  Furthermore, the court noted that it was “after Mr. 
Downing has been Mirandized and after consenting to talk with the officers, Mr. 
Downing, says, yes; it’s methamphetamine. It’s in my pocket, and, yes; you can 
take it.”  (Tr., p. 71, Ls. 10-13.)  In other words, the court found, “in this particular 
case, this was a consensual search.”  (Tr., p. 71, Ls. 17-18.) 
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 Downing attacks this conclusion on appeal, arguing that the district court 
erred by finding that the consent preceded the search.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-
12.)  He does so only by pointing to Downing’s contrary testimony that Officer 
Holtry began pulling the object out before Downing assented to the search: 
Assuming argueno that Mr. Downing’s detention and frisk were 
legal, the District Court erred because Mr. Downing, testified that 
Officer Holtry had already reached in his pocket when he 
consented to the removal of the object…. 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 11.) 
This argument fails to show clear error.  Factual “[f]indings will not be 
deemed clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial evidence in the 
record.”  State v. Lutton, No. 43257, 2017 WL 192846, at *4 (Ct. App. Jan. 18, 
2017) (citing State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 98, 137 P.3d 481, 485 (Ct. App 
2006)).  And the district court’s finding—that the consent preceded the search—
was based on substantial evidence in the record: Officer Holtry’s repeated 
testimony the consent happened before the search.  (Tr., p. 29, L. 18 – p. 30, L. 
4; p. 38, L. 24 – p. 39, L. 9.)   Downing testified to alternative facts below, but 
simply pointing out evidentiary contradictions on appeal falls far short of his 
burden: showing that substantial evidence supporting the court’s findings did not 
exist.  Because the district court’s finding was clearly based on substantial 
evidence, it was clearly not an error.  Downing has failed to show the district 
court erred by concluding that Downing consented to the search. 
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F. Alternatively, Regardless Of The Propriety Of The Frisk Or The Search, 
Because Downing Was Ultimately Arrested For Frequenting A Residence 
Where Drugs Were Present, The Methamphetamine In His Possession 
Would Have Inevitably Been Discovered And Therefore Should Not Be 
Excluded 
 
 In the alternative, even if this Court concludes that the frisk or search of 
Downing was illegal, excluding the evidence of the methamphetamine would be 
improper under the inevitable discovery doctrine.  See State v. Buterbaugh, 138 
Idaho 96, 101-102, 57 P.3d 807, 812-813 (Ct. App. 2002) (inevitable discovery 
doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule).  Where the prosecution 
establishes by a preponderance of proof that the evidence at issue inevitably 
would have been found by lawful means, then exclusion of the evidence is 
improper even if it was actually obtained by constitutionally improper means.  Nix 
v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984); Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 497-98, 36 
P.3d 1278, 1285-86 (2001).  The underlying rationale of this rule is that 
suppression should leave the prosecution in the same position it would have 
been absent the police misconduct, not a worse one.  Nix, 467 U.S. at 442-44; 
Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho at 102, 57 P.3d at 813. 
 Here, the methamphetamine would inevitably have been discovered.  
Regardless of the propriety of the frisk and the search, Downing was present in a 
house in which drugs were found, and admitted to Officer Holtry that he had 
used drugs in the house that day.  (Tr., p. 31, Ls. 3-16.)  The officer accordingly 
had probable cause to suspect Downing of frequenting a place where drugs 
were being used, and arrested Downing for the same.  See Idaho Code § 37-
2732(d); (Tr., p. 31, Ls. 19-23.)  While the district court granted Downing’s 
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motion insofar as it suppressed the earlier statements he made to probation 
officers, the court expressly noted that “the only statements that I will suppress 
are his admissions to the probation officers. I will not suppress the statements 
that were made to Officer Holtry.”  (Tr., p. 72, Ls. 3-6.)  Downing has not 
specifically challenged the suppression of the latter statements on appeal.  (See 
generally, Appellant’s brief.)  Consequently, regardless of whether the frisk or 
search of Downing was proper, Downing’s methamphetamine would inevitably 
been discovered as a search incident to his arrest for frequenting.  Because the 
methamphetamine would have been inevitably discovered, it should therefore 




 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the order of the district 
court. 
 DATED this 6th day of June, 2017. 
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